On August 8, French troops clashed with ethnic Albanians on the
bridge in Mitrovica, that divides the ethnically Albanian and
Serbian parts of the city. In the third day of clashes in Mitrovica,
about 150 Albanian protesters, yelling anti-French slogans, were
pushed back by French soldiers armed with rifles. The past
weekend saw numerous incidents of anti-Serb violence
conducted by ethnic Albanians, some of whom were directly
involved in the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA). In addition,
according to KFOR spokesman Major Roland Lavoile, KFOR
continued to discover illegal arms caches along with uniforms and
supplies linking the finds to the KLA. Most recently, on August 8,
British troops found a number of weapons in a house in Lipljan
searched in connection with a wave of grenade attacks. Along
with weapons, "KLA Interior Ministry Police" identification cards
and uniforms were found in the house. The evidence linking the
KLA to violent activities and the series of clashes between the
KLA and KFOR in Mitrovica illustrate both the continued threat
posed by the KLA and, significantly, the rising tensions between
the KLA and NATO peacekeepers.
The August 9 Scotsman newspaper quoted the NATO KFOR
commander Lieutenant-General Sir Michael Jackson as saying
KLA attacks on KFOR troops had raised questions about KLA
leadership’s ability to control KLA hardliners. "I can't say I am fully
confident that they are in full control," said Jackson. After ethnic
Albanians clashed with French peacekeeping troops for the third
day in Kosovska Mitrovica, Jackson called on KLA leaders to
explain to their people that currently "free Kosovo" represents "a
great deal of what they fought for," although not quite
independence. Despite his concerns about "hardliners" in the
ranks of the KLA, Jackson dismissed the possibility that the KLA
as a whole is close to clashing with the KFOR troops. "We may
get some difficulty with fringe hot-heads and we will deal with it,"
Jackson said. He concluded that challenging KFOR "would be the
most foolish thing to do and I am sure they are not going to be that
foolish."
The continued KLA-perpetrated and facilitated violence in
Kosovo has put NATO in an impossible situation. From the
beginning of its involvement in the Kosovo crisis, NATO’s actions
have, directly and indirectly, supported the KLA and its leader
Hashim Thaci. NATO thought it could use Thaci and the KLA as a
lever in Kosovo, and just as easily put them away after driving out
the Yugoslav Army. However, having enticed NATO into fighting
their war for them, Thaci and the KLA have no intention of putting
down their weapons, and are instead intensifying their fight for
Kosovo’s independence. Now that it has become clear who was
using whom, NATO is left with few if any options to deal with the
problem.
First, NATO is stuck spinning doubletalk, attempting to distinguish
Hashim Thaci and the KLA leadership from KLA "hardliners."
There are none harder in the KLA than Thaci, yet after giving him
legitimacy during Operation Allied Force, NATO finds it politically
impossible to call him a thug. For the same reason, NATO cannot
arrest Thaci. Not only would this be politically difficult, such move
would be tantamount to a declaration of war against the KLA.
NATO can not challenge the KLA head to head without accepting
some brutal casualties. The KLA operated quite successfully
against a similarly sized force of Serbs who knew the territory and
were anything but subtle in their efforts to eradicate a guerrilla
army. To attempt a serious crackdown against the KLA with
winter approaching, in unfamiliar terrain, surrounded by civilian
supporters of the rebels and constrained by NATO’s political and
military baggage would be nothing short of disaster for NATO
forces.
So if NATO can not seriously take on the KLA for political and
military reasons, why not just ignore them and let them finish
expelling the Serbs from Kosovo? After all, just a few tens of
thousands more Serbs to go and NATO can begin to "move
beyond" that political shame. Serbs and Russians charge NATO
with doing just that. However, Serb and Russian forces have also
warned NATO that if it does not rein in the KLA, they will be forced
to do so themselves.
On July 31, Russian forces in Kosovo briefly detained KLA
military leader General Agim Ceku after he was unable to
produce documentation that allows some KLA members to
continue wearing uniforms and carrying sidearms. Following
Ceku’s detention, the Russian Foreign Ministry issued a
statement on August 1 claiming that the KLA was using force
against Serbs in Kosovo and made public threats to international
peacekeepers. The statement further said, "immediate efficient
measures are needed to ensure KLA’s unconditional fulfillment of
all the terms of the Kosovo peacekeeping process and to prevent
development endangering the whole peacemaking operations in
Kosovo." Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov sent
corresponding messages to the commanders of peacekeeping
forces in Kosovo, to foreign ministers of the Western countries
and to the United Nations. Russia’s detention of Ceku was meant
to send a message to NATO that it is ready to step in and provide
protection to Kosovo Serbs.
Belgrade is also more than ready to return to Kosovo and fight the
KLA. In an unmistakable reference to the KLA made on August 8,
Third Yugoslav Army commander Colonel-General Nebojsa
Pavkovic said, "KFOR troops, and its civilian component
especially, are trying to suspend the laws of Serbia and the
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia by forging alliances with illegal
authorities." The Beta news agency cited Pavkovic as insisting
that, according to the Kumanovo agreement between NATO and
the Yugoslav Army, Yugoslav army troops are supposed to return
to Kosovo at some point in the future. Pavkovic has claimed
multiple times that the Yugoslav Army will return if NATO does not
bring unbiased order to the province, and on August 8 he again
noted to Beta that the UN forces in Kosovo "are coping poorly
with the situation on the ground."
Given Russian and Yugoslav willingness, even eagerness, to take
on the KLA, NATO can not afford to do nothing. Such a maneuver
would create the worst of all outcomes for NATO, which would end
up caught in the crossfire with serious questions about whom to
shoot. NATO cannot effectively fight the KLA, it cannot eliminate
the KLA’s leader, and it cannot let the Russians or the Serbs step
in. So NATO is stuck, playing the game of squeezing a little
harder on the "fringe hardliners," while appealing to Thaci to bring
his forces under control. In the end, this squeezing tactic is but a
slight variation of the "do nothing" approach, NATO hoping to step
up pressure just enough to keep the Russians and Serbs away
but not enough to draw too much KLA fire.