by Peter Symonds
Just over a week ago the lower house of the Japanese Diet or parliament
voted overwhelmingly—403 to 86—to grant official legal status to the
country's defacto national flag and national anthem. The bill is likely
to be
ratified in the upper house before the end of the current session due to
end on August 13.
In a country where symbolism plays an important role in political life,
the
push by the Obuchi government for the formal recognition of the Rising
Sun emblem and the “Kimigayo” anthem has a broader significance. The
flag and the song are widely regarded as symbols of the emperor worship
and Japanese militarism of the 1930s and 1940s. Their promotion is
connected to government moves to bolster Japan's military and to modify
the constitutional constraints on its operations.
The Diet's decision on July 22 was met with demonstrations outside the
parliament by student and other groups who have pledged to continue
their opposition. One protester was forcibly removed from the public
gallery. Keiko Tsuwa of the Japanese Women's Caucus Against War
commented: “No one can be proud of them as national symbols without
true remorse and apology for the wartime aggression against Asia.”
The flag and the anthem have been used ceremonially in the past. But the
ambition of conservative politicians and right-wing groups to give these
symbols legal recognition has previously been thwarted by a widespread
hostility to Japanese militarism and the wartime military regime.
Throughout the post-war period, the US-Japan Defence Pact signed in
1952 has repeatedly been a target of opposition and protests.
In Japan's schools, the use of the Rising Sun flag and the singing of the
Kimigayo, which calls for “the reign of the Emperor to continue for 1,000
generations,” has been a source of sharp conflict between school
administrations and the teachers' union. In February, a school principal
in
southern Japan hanged himself after being caught in the middle of a
disagreement between the school board and teachers over the singing of
the anthem at graduation ceremonies.
Obuchi seized on the incident to push for legal recognition of the flag
and
anthem. The legislation, he claimed, was necessary to eliminate any
ambiguity in their use and thus prevent any repetition of the suicide in
Hiroshima. Following the vote, the Tokyo City Board of Education
announced that it was disciplining a primary school music teacher for
refusing to provide the piano accompaniment for the anthem during
school entrance ceremonies in March.
In the course of the Diet debate, Obuchi spoke cautiously insisting that
the emperor was simply “the symbol of the state and of the unity of the
people, deriving his position from the will of the people with whom
resides sovereign power”. But, as Obuchi is well aware, any elevation of
the status of the emperor has deeper political implications.
The issue goes back to the US occupation of Japan and the negotiations
over the country's post-war constitution. Sections of the Japanese ruling
class prevailed upon the US administration to retain the emperor as a
constitutional monarch arguing that he served as a key ideological linchpin
for national identity and the ruling elites. Emperor Hirohito was absolved
of any war crimes and retained his position even though stripped of his
former powers and his quasi-divine status.
For the last 50 years, right-wing Japanese nationalism has always been
bound up with the promotion of the emperor and the defence of his
wartime regime. Last month Obuchi himself provoked criticism at home
when, in an essay in the US edition of Time magazine, he nominated
Hirohito as “Person of the Century”. Two years ago, he was head of a
parliamentary grouping that promotes pilgrimages to Tokyo's Yasukuni
Shrine, which is dedicated to Japan's war dead and is a focus for
right-wing nationalists.
As in other countries, the rise of nationalist sentiment in Japan is
connected to a deepening social and economic crisis which has produced
the highest levels of unemployment since the 1940s and growing social
polarisation and dislocation. Incapable of resolving any of the problems
facing working people, Japanese politicians of all stripes have increasingly
resorted to nationalist appeals and, in the absence of any progressive
alternative, have won significant support. Just three months ago, Ishihara
Shintaro, author of the book The Japan That Can Say No, who argues
for a more vigorous assertion of Japan's interests against the US and
other rivals, won the prestigious post of Tokyo governor against major
party candidates. The latest opinion polls show that around 60 percent
supports the legislation to recognise the Japanese flag and anthem.
Obuchi's immediate political aims in pressing the flag issue are to bolster
his position within the ruling Liberal Democratic Party, particularly in
the
lead-up to the party presidential elections to take place on September
15. He is likely to win the position and retain the prime ministership.
Obuchi has also strengthened the ruling coalition by incorporating the
Buddhist-based New Komeito party. New Komeito, which in the past
has taken an avowedly pacifist stance, has supported the flag law and
also government legislation aimed at expanding the role of the military.
The Japanese constitution formulated under the US occupation
authorities contains a so-called pacifist clause ruling out the use of
military
force. Following the collapse of the Chinese nationalist regime in 1949,
the US pressed Japan to reforge its military under the guise of
“self-defence forces”. As a result Japan presently has substantial armed
forces, but the government remains constrained by the constitution in its
development of overtly offensive weapons and the overseas deployment
of the military.
The resurrection of Japanese nationalism is closely linked to the
expansion of the military. Earlier this year, in the face of considerable
opposition, the Obuchi government passed legislation permitting the
Japanese military to play a more active role within the Asian region in
support of US armed forces—something the US administration has been
demanding for some time. Now the Japanese Diet is moving to establish
a committee to study revising the constitution—its pacifist clause in
particular.
The Obuchi government has seized on several incidents involving North
Korea—its test firing of a ballistic missile last year, and the incursion
of a
North Korean vessel into Japanese waters—to create an air of panic and
mold public opinion into accepting an expanded military. North Korea,
an economically crippled country, is being transformed in the media into
a
major military threat to Japan.
In recent weeks, Japan along with the US has issued strong warnings to
Pyongyang against any new test firing of a ballistic missile. Both Obuchi
and Foreign Minister Masahiko Komura have warned that Japan could
cut off funds earmarked for the building of two new light-water nuclear
reactors in North Korea if Pyongyang proceeds with the launch. Such a
move would call into question the US-North Korea agreed framework
pact signed in 1994 to lessen tensions on the Korean peninsula.
A 500-page report recently published by the Japanese Defence Agency
also focuses on North Korea, arguing that Japan should not only have the
right to defend itself but to use pre-emptive military strikes in the case
of
likely attacks. It calls for the establishment of a network of spy satellites
to enable Japan to independently monitor North Korea, for continued
development of a missile defence system and for more advanced
weaponry, such as air-to-air refueling tankers.
In the aftermath of the NATO bombing campaign of Yugoslavia,
dominated by the US, discussion took place in the various European
capitals over the need for the expansion of an independent military
capacity to defend European economic and strategic interests.
Undoubtedly similar conclusions are being drawn in Tokyo as the
Japanese ruling class seeks to further its aims against those of its major
rivals in the increasingly volatile Asian Pacific region.