ENTHUSIASTS for an ever-closer
European Union are pretty chuffed these days. The great venture that
started nearly 50 years ago with plans for France and Germany to combine
their coal and steel industries has developed into something only
visionaries then believed in. Common market, single market, single currency—all
are in place.
Now for political union, starting with a common foreign policy.
The war against Serbia has given the notion of a real European foreign
policy, replete even with a military dimension of its own, a shot in the
arm. It will be pushed by the new European Commission, the EU’s
executive, under Romano Prodi, and promoted by Europe’s new
foreign-policy spokesman, Javier Solana, the outgoing secretary-general
of NATO. Keeping watch, and keeping the officials straight, will be the
newly elected European Parliament, now more muscular than ever.
The only fly in the ointment, in the eyes of some at least, is the “collapse”
of the vaunted new currency, which has slipped by some 13% against the
dollar since it was launched on January 1st. Certainly, ministers have
mishandled the matter, letting the markets see that they are embarrassed
and confused. In fact, however, there is little need to be. Currencies
go
up and down: that is why (or so it was said) the euro was invented in the
first place—to provide an intra-European zone of financial stability. And
the slippage against other currencies is hardly dramatic: roughly 8% in
trade-weighted terms. This decline should, if anything, actually help
Europe’s economy, providing a welcome boost to demand. The slide
may upset those who see their currency as a symbol of national strength,
but the optimists are probably right in saying that the euro is still destined
to match the dollar as a reserve currency. When that happens, it will
underline Europe’s coming status as a cohesive new power.
And as a rival to America? If Europe is serious about forging a common
foreign policy, an opportunity undoubtedly awaits it. The European Union
already has 15 members whose combined wealth just about matches that
of the United States and whose population is a third as big again. When
it
brings in new members from the east, it will be an even bigger affair.
This
opportunity needs to be grasped. Though the United States was crucial in
winning the war against Serbia, its reluctance to get involved—for
instance, with ground troops who might have been killed—was more
palpable than ever before. The Republicans were divided. Bill Clinton
wavered. Congress dithered too. Never has it been plainer that Europe
must do more on its own, particularly in its own back yard. In both
peacekeeping and reconstruction in the Balkans, it is starting to do just
that. That is new, and welcome. Is superpower Europe therefore
arriving?
Well, not yet awhile. For the moment, Europeans should keep a sense of
proportion. They can hardly point to Kosovo as an exclusively, or even
substantially, European triumph—if triumph it is. On their own, the
Europeans would have got nowhere. Over four-fifths of the air strikes
were carried out by America. And it remains to be seen whether
Europeans can handle most of the peacekeeping and rebuilding without
recourse to extra American cash, guns or troops. Besides, though the
European bits of NATO stuck together during the campaign, it is doubtful
that they would have done so had the Serbs held out for, say, another
two months.
As for Europe’s new executive, a bit of realism is in order here too. True,
Mr Prodi is likely to present a better image of Europe, both to Europeans
and to the outside world, than did his predecessor. But the most powerful
body in the European Union is still the Council of Ministers, which speaks
for national governments, most of which remain reluctant to be swallowed
up into a superstate, superpower or not.
In any event, Mr Prodi’s team may not work altogether smoothly. The
trade commissioner, Pascal Lamy, is a Frenchman who for many years
sat at the elbow of Jacques Delors, a former EU president. If he turns
out
to be a champion of free trade, who can carry his countrymen with him,
his appointment will have been fully vindicated. If not, Europe is unlikely
to find a single voice in the one area—trade—in which it already
commands an audience. In foreign policy more generally, there is anyway
plenty of scope for muddle. Chris Patten, the last British governor of
Hong Kong, is to co-ordinate policy, in co-operation (or competition?)
with Mr Solana.
Rival or helpmeet?
The larger point is that Europeans do not yet think, still less act, as
one.
Germany, now involved in foreign affairs as it has not been since the
second world war, was no more ready to fight a ground war in Kosovo
than was the United States. Italy regards almost all foreign ventures with
great suspicion. Many European countries see their own commercial
advantage as far more important than a common front in favour of, say,
human rights in China. Moreover, prickly nations like France and Britain
(though an increasingly co-operative pair abroad) will not, any time soon,
allow themselves to be overridden in foreign matters by a combination of
other EU members.
Even the motives for a common foreign policy vary. Some Europeans
want it as an expression of Europe’s common political will; others as a
rival to, and restraint upon, the United States. If it turned into nothing
more than a form of anti-Americanism, it would be a disaster. For the
foreseeable future, NATO, preferably in synch with the UN, will be the
linchpin of western security. America must still take the lead in dealing
with most of the world’s danger zones. But in near-at-hand places like
the Balkans, America will happily defer to Europe. And even in areas like
the Middle East or Russia, Europe ought to be able to play a
complementary role to America. Europe can and should exercise a
greater influence in the world, but it will not be a superpower for many
years yet.