By Rahul Bedi,
Jane's correspondent
4 June 1999,
A massive intelligence failure by India’s military and
counter-intelligence agencies to detect the infiltration of over 600
armed
Islamic guerrillas into northern Kashmir has necessitated the ongoing
air
strikes and huge ground offensive to dislodge them.
After over four weeks of ground action and 10 days of air strikes against
the
insurgents, who India claims are Pakistan-backed, they are still holding
strategic
ridges at heights over 16,000 ft and are proving difficult to dislodge.
Indian
military officials said pushing them back would be a “slow process”
and may
even take three to six months.
Pakistan denies India’s allegations but has admitted the insurgents
came through
its territory.
Senior officials privately acknowledged that the stand-off in Kashmir’s
remote
Kargil, Drass, Batalik and Muskho valley region was due to the inability
of
Indian military intelligence and the country’s counter-intelligence
service, the
Research and Intelligence Wing (RAW), to spot them and take timely
action.
They said for weeks the army had failed to realise the presence of
hundreds of
armed intruders, comprising Taliban fighters from Afghanistan entrenched
4-7km
inside Indian territory. After crossing the line of control (LC) that
forms the
disputed border with Pakistan, the militants dug themselves in behind
sangars, or
cement bunkers, which they swiftly built.
Infiltration
Indian Defence Minister George Fernandes said the intrusion was first
spotted
around 5 May by an itinerant shepherd, who alerted an army patrol.
The ensuing
firefight with the intruders awakened the army to the enormity of the
intrusion. It
posed a deadly threat to National Highway 1 A connecting Kashmir’s
capital
Srinagar to the military outposts at Leh: the staging point for troops
on the
20,000 ft high disputed Siachen glacier.
Spread over ridges across a 40km stretch, the intruders directly threatened
Indian Army supply lines along Highway 1A to forward bases bordering
Pakistan and China by accurately directing Pakistani artillery fire
from across the
LC onto the road. The intruders were also proving difficult to dislodge
in the
snowy terrain. All movement there is easy to detect at lower heights
and the
possibility of suffering casualties is alarmingly high. This made aerial
strikes
imperative which in turn raised tension between the two nuclear-capable
neighbours, who have fought two of their three wars over Kashmir since
independence 52 years ago.
Intelligence breakdown
“An organised body of around 600 armed men who managed to establish
themselves over a large area could not possibly have gone unnoticed
unless there
was a complete intelligence breakdown,” said a senior military officer,
declining
to be named. He said a lack of co-ordination between RAW and military
intelligence officials and absence of mutual confidence between them
was
responsible for the Kashmir fiasco. The fact that India’s civil and
defence
intelligence agencies were working constantly at cross-purposes with
one
another, almost always with serious consequences, was one of the worst-kept
secrets in Indian espionage circles.
Senior intelligence sources said the army was largely to blame for the
border
conflict escalating since it had failed to assess Pakistan’s modus
operandi in
conducting Kashmir’s “proxy war”, even after 10 years of combating
it. Over
20,000 people have died in Kashmir’s civil war for an independent Muslim
homeland since 1989. India blames Pakistan for ‘sponsoring’ the conflict;
Pakistan denies the allegation.
MI 25, a top-secret military intelligence cell responsible for collecting
cross-border intelligence, had also failed to acquire information on
the proposed
infiltration. The cell now claims it could not have been possible without
the
planning skills of the Pakistani Army and its back-up logistics, such
as artillery
fire and helicopters to support militant supply lines. “Militants do
not use
helicopters,” said Major General J J Singh, deputy director of military
operations
in the region.
Other military officials said the Kargil campaign had been planned by
the
Pakistan Army over many months, even as it was engaging in peace talks
with
India in February. They also claimed the militants were accompanied
by
members of the Special Services Group, a crack Pakistani commando unit
specialising in mountain warfare that had been training for the raid
for many
months. Pakistan denies all such assertions.
An ‘open wound’
The Kashmir dispute has bedevilled relations between the neighbours.
It has
turned the region into one of the world’s most volatile flashpoints
after the
neighbours became nuclear weapon powers and now continue to build missiles
capable of striking deep into each other’s territory. Kashmir remains
the ‘core
issue’ between the two rivals, predicated to all peace talks that invariably
flounder over intractable stands on the former princely principality.
Pakistan declared last year it would not sign the nuclear Comprehensive
Test
Ban Treaty (CTBT) unless the Kashmir dispute was “suitably” resolved.
The
then foreign minister, Gohar Ayub Khan, said the quarrel over Kashmir
could
trigger a nuclear war “at any time”. He said that unlike the Cold War
in Europe,
where no territorial disputes were involved, the Kashmir issue was
an “open
wound” and needed suturing.
Pakistan has also refused India’s offer of a ‘no- first nuclear strike’
pending a
settlement over the disputed state. After its multiple nuclear tests
last year India
had unilaterally declared it would work towards a second strike nuclear
weapons capability, building only a minimum nuclear deterrent.
Meanwhile, it has now emerged that India’s federal home ministry was
informed
about the infiltration of Islamic insurgents into northern Kashmir
at least four
months before they were discovered in early May.
Official sources said the intelligence wing of the paramilitary Border
Security
Force (BSF) had in January sent a report to home ministry officials
stating that
several hundred armed Muslim guerrillas had taken up positions in the
Kargil
region, up to 8km inside Indian territory from the LC.
Taking advantage of last year’s moderate snowfall, the BSF’s intelligence
wing
declared, the Pakistani-backed militants had occupied vantage points
over
16,000 ft high, threatening National Highway 1A. “The infiltrators
occupied
these heights as early as January,” the report stated.
They faced no resistance. Besides bunkers, they also built up supply
lines
through the occupation of high ridges leading back into Pakistan-held
Kashmir.
“It is surprising that the militants’ movement went unnoticed by the
Indian troops,
even though they were supposed to be dominating the gaps in the LC
by sending
long range patrols,” the report stated.
Reconnaissance and infiltration
India’s disputed border in Kashmir is 776km long and snakes through
inhospitable, snowy wasteland. In the inhospitable Kargil region, where
the
conflict is raging, it cuts across deep gorges and near impassable
valleys,
perennially under several feet of snow.
Earlier this year a Kashmiri militant, during interrogation, had also
revealed
Pakistan’s plans to create “disturbances” in Kashmir by infiltrating
militants into
the Kargil region.
Azhar Shafi Mir of Baramullah, a border town 70km north of Srinagar,
told the
authorities around January that the Pakistani security forces had been
training
Afghan mercenaries specifically for such an operation. The interrogation
report
was also forwarded to the federal government.
Other sources said Pakistani helicopters had carried out an aerial survey
of the
Kargil area in January and reportedly video-filmed the topography to
help
prepare a detailed map. The violation of India’s air space was reported
by the
local police to the army but no action was taken or countermeasures
adopted.
Having gathered all the basic information, the Pakistani Army reportedly
raised a
battalion of youngsters from its northern areas of Gilgit and Baltistan,
along with
Taliban fighters from Afghanistan, and rigorously trained them in high-altitude
survival and warfare. The first batch of these well-equipped guerrillas
intruded
around 8km across the LC into the Batalik area early this year and
began
constructing sangars capable of withstanding artillery fire and missiles
from
possible aerial attacks. The remaining militants were to join them
later in batches
of 15-20 each.
Lost patrol
A group of local shepherds stumbled upon the intruders, who roughed
them up
but spared their lives after they said they were Muslims. On returning
to the
Kargil area they reported the matter to the army and a 12-man was sent
to
investigate. It never returned. Army officials presume all 12 are either
dead or
captured by the intruders. Even then the army presumed they had been
lost and
sent another patrol — much later in early May — which eventually revealed
the
extent of the intrusion.
Intelligence sources said it was also mystifying how Indian military
intelligence
and other agencies that routinely monitor radio transmissions between
Kashmiri
militants and their Inter Services Intelligence (ISI) “minders” across
the LC in
Pakistan were unable to eavesdrop on the exchanges made by the Kargil
intruders. This failure becomes all the more mysterious with the army
now
revealing that the intruders operate on military frequencies using
powerful army
radio sets which they can now monitor.
Ungentlemanly acts
The only alibi for India’s military failure in detecting the intrusions
in Kargil is
Pakistani “treachery” in violating the LC that it had agreed to respect
after the
third war in 1971 and dismiss the to intrusion as “ungentlemanly”.
For several decades Indian troops would abandon high-altitude posts
in the
region due to rigorous winter conditions, where temperatures average
-20°C,
dipping to -60°C. Despite combating the decade-long insurgency
in Kashmir,
bolstered mostly by foreign mercenaries crossing the LC as local recruitment
dried up, the army saw no reason to change its routine. The complacent
army
went a step further and even reduced its strength from a division to
a brigade in
the Kargil region. Instead of periodic preventative deployments of
troops in the
region, the army retained its option of moving forces into the area
only if a
conflict seemed imminent. The army also dismissed as “routine” repeated
attempts by the Pakistani Army over the last two years to push back
Indian
troops from their positions along the LC and in the adjoining Siachen
Glacier.
“The Pakistanis were merely testing the ground before mounting a serious
offensive,” said a senior military official involved in the ongoing
conflict. “We
missed the signals.”
And having prepared its ground well, Pakistan reportedly used this loophole
along the LC to push across a group of trained men to hold strategic
ridges and
threaten the army’s movements below. The intruders chose their terrain
well. It
was surrounded by jagged peaks 18,000ft high with absolutely no cover
for any
aggressor. Starving out the intruders had not worked as they were well
stocked,
with their supply lines still open, despite contrary claims by the
Indian Army.
Intelligence officials said the militants, divided into groups of around
15, slept
during the day inside their sangars and spread out at night to rain
machine gun
and mortar fire on the Indian troops below. They claimed each militant
had
reportedly been paid around US$20,000 by the Pakistani military.
Military sources said around 30,000 soldiers had been deployed by the
first
week of June to flush out around 300-400 militants. They were apparently
were
mounting a “holding operation” before pushing the militants back over
the next
few months.