Signs Finally Emerge of Coup Threat to Saddam Hussein
On December 20, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein declared that Iraq
had emerged "victorious" after Operation Desert Fox, the 70-hour
aerial bombardment of Iraq by the United States and the United
Kingdom. In a speech broadcast on Qatar's Al-Jazira satellite
television, Saddam praised Arab people for their "support of Iraq
in the face of aggression" but attacked "the weak, the two-faced,
the grudge bearers and the traitors." Saddam has survived the
latest round of U.S. led military attacks, aimed ostensibly at
his weapons of mass destruction. However, those attacks
apparently had a secondary goal -- supporting a coup attempt
launched from within Iraq. Judging from Saddam's statement and
other evidence from within Iraq, the second goal may be bearing
fruit.
Fears of a coup have prompted a large number of purges in Iraq
since the end of the 1991 Gulf War. The commanders of military
units have been liquidated many times, with units reorganized for
fear that they may rise up against him. Prior to Desert Fox, the
Iraqi military experienced another purge -- one strikingly
different for its extent and the accompanying directives. The
Iraqi armed forces are composed of five regular army corps, five
"regular" Republican Guard divisions, and one "special"
Republican Guard division. Before Operation Desert Fox, the
regular army corps were deployed along Iraq's borders. This has
not changed. In northern Iraq, the 1st and 5th corps are
stationed around the cities of Krkuk and Mosul in order to
protect against Turkish incursions and to guard the oilfields of
this area from the depredations of Kurdish militias. The 3rd and
4th corps were deployed in southern Iraq along the Kuwaiti and
Iranian borders, respectively, to guard these oil rich areas from
Shiite opposition groups in south-central Iraq. The 2nd corps is
stationed directly to the east of Baghdad to protect the eastern
flank from Iranian incursions directed against Iraq or against
Iranian opposition groups based inside Iraq.
Shadowing these army corps were divisions of Iraq's elite
"regular" Republican Guard divisions. Since they are the best-
paid and best-equipped divisions, the Republican Guard divisions
reinforced the regular army corps in case of attack. But they
also served to monitor any corps commander that evidenced even
the slightest inclination to march on Baghdad. This is why the
Republican Guard divisions were always physically stationed
between the regular army units and Baghdad. In this way, the
regular Republican Guard keeps an eye on any over-zealous
commander. One or two of these regular Republican Guard
divisions were always kept around the Shiite areas of Najaf and
Karbala, for fear of an Iranian-backed Shiite uprising.
The "special" Republican Guard division was stationed in Baghdad
proper and operated as a fail-safe mechanism by providing a final
line of defense against a coup led by a commander of a regular
Republican Guard division. It also was the key unit that ran the
concealment operation for Iraq's weapon's of mass destruction
(WMD) operations. Because of the role of the special Republican
Guard, it was the most likely one to have been directly targeted
by U.S./British strikes.
Immediately in advance of the commencement of Desert Fox, Saddam
Hussein issued a number of directives altering this structure.
The commanders of the regular army corps were placed under
regional commanders who were recruited from among Saddam's
closest aides. And units of the regular Republican Guard were
all redeployed to Baghdad and to southern Iraq.
The first directive dealt with the command of regular army and
naval forces. It stated that "until further notice, four
regional commands shall be established." The first command, the
Northern Command, is responsible for the northern half of Iraq
and includes the 1st and 5th corps. The Northern Command was
given to Staff General Izzat Ibrahim, the second in command in
Iraq, and the person that was allegedly the target of an
assassination attempt last month. The second, the Southern
Command, was placed under, a new commander, Staff General Ali-
Hasan al-Majid. The Southern Command controls the area closest
to the Iranian and Kuwait borders and has direct control of the
Iraqi 3rd and 4th corps and the small Iraqi navy.
The third is the Central Euphrates command. This command
included the Shiite districts of south central Iraq and came
under the command of Muhammad Hamzah al-Zubayadi, an individual
who is not a military figure but a member of the Baath party.
The are no units attached to his command. The reasons for this
are clear, as there are no regular army units regularly stationed
in that area. However, at present, two Republican Guard
divisions are reportedly in the vicinity and under the direct
command of Saddam's son, Quasay Hussein.
The last, and perhaps the most important command for the security
of the regime, is the Central Region command. This one controls
Baghdad and the surrounding region. It falls under the direct
command of the Iraqi Minister of Defense, Staff General Sultan
Hashim Ahmad, with the remaining Iraqi 2nd Corps under his
authority.
Though none of the regular army units are being physically moved
around Iraq, the fact that they are now reassigned under the
direct command of the highest-ranking members of the Baath party
in Iraq is significant. This means that Saddam has virtually
lost faith in all of his other commanders. More evidence of this
fact lies in the next set of directives. They state that, "the
duties of commanding a region shall be to defend within the
boundaries of the geographical area... to confront any foreign
aggressors that target Iraq's sovereignty, its independence, and
security and to preserve internal security..." Additionally, the
last few directives state that these commanders should receive
instructions only from Saddam himself through his special
security service, the Fadaiyin, and that Saddam himself will
remain in direct control of all air force, army aircraft, and all
air defense units.
What these directives suggest is that not only may no regular
army unit be moved without the approval of Saddam himself, but
also they may not take any action without Saddam's approval.
This means that even though Saddam has placed his most trusted
aides in charge of these units, he has put in place an
institutional mechanism, the security service, to control them as
well. Finally, by keeping control over the airforce, he has
established yet another fail-safe mechanism, this one to thwart
Iraqi tanks rolling on Baghdad.
There may be other reasons why Saddam is running scared. The
"Al-Zaman" newspaper in London reported, on December 18, that
Saddam Hussein along with his two sons, and the Minister of
Defense have been hiding in a bunker in the Karakh district of
Baghdad since the initial warnings of an air strike were
confirmed. The next day, "Al Zaman" reported that armed members
of the Baath party were being deployed throughout Baghdad and
other major Iraqi cities to confront any "unrest or emergencies
that might arise." Also, since the strikes took out virtually
all of Iraq's major communications facilities, the Iraqi armed
forces have been forced to operate via massagers and mobile radio
transmitters.
Why all the paranoia? There is evidence that the Iraqi
opposition has begun to respond positively to increasing U.S.
efforts aimed at toppling Saddam. A rebellion may have already
begun. On December 19, the same day that the 70-hour aerial
bombardment of Iraq came to a halt, the London based "Al-Sharq
al-Awsat" newspaper reported that armed civilians in southern
Iraq were engaged in an uprising against Iraq's special security
forces. The newspapers stated that an armed group tried to seize
a radio and television station around Salihiya but were repulsed
after a three-hour confrontation with Republican Guard forces.
The newspaper also spoke of armed clashes around Hibibah and
Thawrah districts located southwest of Baghdad. Other reports
tell of night-time sabotage of power plants and other
infrastructure targets in the south.
In an interview with "al-Sharq al-Awsat", also on December 19,
Hamid al-Bayyati, the representative of the Supreme Council for
the Islamic revolution in Iraq (SCIRI) reported that he had
received information that Iraq is making changes to its forces in
order to protect regime from a popular uprising. SCIRI is one of
the most powerful opposition groups in Iraq and is made up of
pro-Iranian Shiites from the southern Iraqi districts. Bayyati
reported that, in order to quell any popular uprising in southern
Iraq, Republican Guard forces have been withdrawn from Mosul in
northern Iraq and deployed to Baghdad. He mentioned as well that
another Republican Guard division took up positions on the main
road between Baghdad and Basra.
This gives further credence to the fact that Saddam is worried
about a rebellion or invasion in the south. Additionally, the
Republican Guard division that moved south from Mosul likely took
the place of the special Republican Guard division that guarded
Baghdad and appears to have been targeted by the air strikes.
This would mean that not only are there are no elite Iraqi forces
to check either Turkish incursions into northern Iraq or Kurdish
dissident groups, but Saddam is now leaving the 1st and 5th corps
without Republican Guard watchdogs. By moving yet another
Republican Guard division to the south of Baghdad, this one from
the border with Iran, Saddam leaves the 2nd corps unchecked and
the Iranian border without elite reinforcements. Redeploying
troops to maximize internal security has undermined the logic of
Iraq's national security. With Iraq's communication
infrastructure bombed out and the Republican Guard pulled back to
Baghdad, Saddam has opened a window of opportunity for any
dissident officers in the 1st, 2nd, and 5th corps.
Essentially, Iraqi is left with its elite units stationed around
Baghdad and southern Iraq. While the idea of a land invasion of
Iraq aimed at removing Saddam has been broached in the U.S.
before, this is obviously not an option considering the political
climate in Washington. Bombing in advance of impeachment
hearings is one thing, but an invasion is another altogether.
However, another possibility, a Shiite uprising, may not be too
far off. After all, in the same December 19 report, Bayyati also
mentioned that Iraqi forces were already shelling Shiites in the
Amarah and Najaf administrative districts in southern Iraq.
There was also a report in "Al Hayat" on December 17 that Ali Aqa
Mohammadi, the Iranian security official in charge of Iraqi
affairs, was actively pursuing contacts with Iraqi opposition
groups and may have also met with officials from the British
government to discuss the situation. "Al- Hayat" cited a source
as saying that Mohammadi wanted to ascertain what role the Iraqi
opposition, more specifically, the Iranian–backed SCIRI, would
play in any efforts to topple Saddam. The source also quoted him
as saying, "if the Americans are serious about removing Saddam,
then Tehran would not object" and that Iran "is watching the
situation in Iraq with interest and will adopt a more effective
policy now that it has decided to support the change." However,
it must be noted that the U.S. would not welcome an Iraq in which
Iranian interests were dominant, nor do the Iranians want a post-
insurrection Iraq dominated by the United States. During the
recent talks between Iranian Vice President Hasan Habibi, Syrian
officials and Iraqi opposition figures in Damascus, Habibie
explicitly warned against the dangers of a U.S. effort to topple
Saddam.
To sum up the situation, air strikes, no matter how intense,
cannot topple Saddam in the absence of an on-the-ground invasion
or an armed insurrection. However, it seems that the air strikes
may have sufficiently degraded Saddam's power, particularly his
communications infrastructure and his special Republican Guard
unit, such that the SCIRI has been enticed to act on its own.
There is a small window of opportunity for the Iraqi opposition.
Saddam appears to be off balance. With Iranian and U.S. backing,
the opposition may have a chance to strike. Yet the U.S. and
Iran are still only allied in their opposition to Saddam, and
remain at odds over what comes next. The Iraqi opposition
remains divided, and has failed previously to pose a credible
threat to Saddam. Unless someone moves quickly, Saddam will soon
reestablish his footing.